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LEGAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL CARE. II**
A CHANGE IN THE FRAME OF REFERENCE
In the preceding lecture I tried to place before the reader a frame of
reference of discussing at some length the nature of the physician-patient
relationship. This relationship is in essence a contract between two equal
parties, but the medical profession tends to look at it as one in which the
physician plays the dominant role and the patient a dependent one. I
attempted to explore the effect of the conflict between the two points of
view in looking at two broad questions, the matter of civil liability which
grows out of the one-to-one relationship, and proposals for the provision
of medical care for chronic illness which grows out of the broader
relationship of public to profession. I pointed out how disparities between
the expectation of the public and the norms of the profession have resulted
in reaction patterns on the part of the public. We saw, as in the case of
"Good Samaritan" legislation, that the reaction of the public could inure
to the benefit of the profession, and in the case of application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, that the reaction can be distinctly disadvantageous.
In a similar fashion, we could also look at the current dialogue between
public and profession on payment for medical care which is based in some
measure on the respective attitudes each holds concerning the nature of
the relationship.
I have now selected the two remaining topics-the use of human beings
as experimental subjects and the care of the terminally ill-for several
reasons. These topics were selected not only because of current interest
but also because there are as yet relatively unformulated positions on the
proper management of the two problems. An attempt then may be made
at formulating a position based on the frame of reference with which we
began.
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It is entirely possible in doing so to look at the variance between the
societal norm and the professional ethic in a somewhat different fashion
than the previous paper. They were then, two distinct and separate stand-
ards. It may be more proper, however, to look at the one as supplementing
and augmenting the other. In this context then, the professional ethic would
serve to enlarge upon the societal norm. The rights possessed by the
patient under his doctor-patient contract would thus be expanded by the
position of trust in which the physician is placed. In the topics of this paper
this position would seem to be necessary.
HUMAN BEINGS AS EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS
Many will undoubtedly recall the problem that occurred in New York
last year on the question of injection of cultured neoplastic cells into
patients at a chronic hospital. This brought into focus the problems that
occur in employing people in investigational projects when there is as yet
no concensus as to the proper conduct of experimental work.
Prior to World War II there was so little human experimentation that
no one realized a problem existed. There were the classical stories of
Walter Reed and his volunteers, of Arrowsmith and the ethical problem of
a control series, but research as we now know it was minimal. The little
being done in the 1940's was essentially limited to evaluations of newly
introduced antibiotics that were so dramatic in their effect, and so much
more efficacious than standard medication, that there was no problem either
about enlisting willing volunteers or in maintaining controls. We had such
limited supplies in the early days that only a portion of our patients could
be chosen; we chose our patients by some chance process, and by and large
our only problem consisted of attempts by members of the patient's
families to pressure staff members to get a specific patient included in the
"experimental" series.
When a study was projected that required healthy volunteers, we would
enlist medical students who volunteered either for the small amount of
money we might be able to offer or because it might be good business to
endear oneself to a faculty member, or we would go to a prison and
enlist volunteers whose motives were varied. Some hoped for an early
release, and used volunteering as an item in their favor before parole
boards. Some, no doubt, were trying to deal with their guilt feelings con-
cerning their prior antisocial behavior. With these two sources of supply,
however, there was usually sufficient "material" for the limited studies
that went on.
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The atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II included
experimentation on persons condemned to death. We reacted to this
for several reasons. One, of course, was the fact that we could not justify
in our own minds the basis for the imprisonment and the condemnation
in the first place. Secondly, we felt that the experiments were conducted in
a fashion that we would not have tolerated in our laboratory animals.
Thirdly, we felt that little if any of the work performed was of such moment
as to be of value to the scientific world. Hence, no possible justification
could be found for the actions of the members of the German medical
profession who conducted the experiments in question.
The Nuremberg Trials, conducted by the Allies after the conclusion of
hostilities, concerned themselves with the persons who participated in this
work as well as with the persons who had committed the other "crimes
against humanity." In order to provide a basis for judging the participants,
a code of ethics was formulated which purported to be and undoubtedly was
the norm of acceptable behavior at that time. I think it is important to
review the principal points of the code at this point. The code states:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-
reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should
have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject
matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened
decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an
affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made
known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the
method and means by which it is to be conducted; and the effects upon his
health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the
experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experi-
ment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated
to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and
not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of
animal experimentation and knowledge of the natural history of the
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disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will
justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason
to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in
those experiments in which the experimental physicians also serve as
subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined
by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the ex-
periment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided
to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of
injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through
all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the
experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be
at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical
or mental state at which continuation of the experiment seems to him to
be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must
be prepared to terminate the experiment at any state, if he has probable
cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful
judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to
result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.'
Here we are less than a score of years later and we have some serious
questions as to the applicability of some of the provisions of the Nuremberg
code. Particularly troublesome are the provisions concerning consent when
we consider "double-blind" designs. In the recent regulations promulgated
by the Food and Drug administration concerning the testing of new drugs,
this concern has been taken into account, and consent is required "except
where this is not feasible or, in the investigator's professional judgment,
it is contrary to the best interests of the subjects."'
The matter of consent becomes most material because (a) the attitude of
the courts to consent in purely therapeutic situations has undergone change,
(b) the amount of research involving human subjects has increased tre-
mendously, and (c) we have seen a shift in the willingness of patients to
participate in various types of investigations. This shift has largely been
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due to the experience with Thalidomide, when it forcefully became apparent
that drugs can be dangerous even when they appear to be innocuous.
As might also be expected, question has been raised as to the ap-
plicability of the Nuremberg code since experimentation is not a single
entity, but a spectrum. When we talk about an experiment involving a
determination of the time required for loss of life from freezing (as an
example of the kind of investigation that was done in the Nazi concen-
tration camps), this is a far cry from testing a new therapeutic agent for a
disorder with which a particular subject is currently affected, and a set of
rules can only be meaningful if we are clear as to the situation to which
they apply. It should be apparent that in order to deal with the problem
intelligently, we must distinguish among the various situations with which
we might be faced.
One might start with an overall definition of experimentation. McCance
defines it as "anything done to a patient which is not generally accepted
as being for his direct therapeutic benefit or as contributing to the diagnosis
of his disease."' Hence, anything that might be generally accepted as good
for the patient should not properly be thought of as experimentation.
Interestingly enough, however, the widely quoted dictum that "a doctor
experiments at his peril" is derived from a case decided in 1767' which
really dealt with a departure from accepted means of therapy, and had
nothing to do with the subject to which we are addressing ourselves
today.
INVESTIGATIONS CLASSIFIED
In an attempt to classify investigations so that one might place our
system of rules in appropriate context, Schreiner' has divided investigations
into five groups depending on the degree of benefit to the patient. His clas-
sification is as follows:
1. An investigation to determine the relative efficacy of an agent which
may improve the immediate clinical condition of the patient. This poses
little problem either for the patient or the physician from the ethical or
legal point of view. There may be problems of how one obtains consent for
a double-blind design, and it is this type of case in which the F.D.A. rules
are meant to apply. It is, of course, this type of clinical trial that Bradford
Hill was referring to when he stated:
Where the value of a treatment, new or old, is doubtful, there may be a higher
moral obligation to test it critically than to continue to prescribe it year-in-year-out
with the support merely of custom or wishful thinking.6
398
Volume 37, APril, 1965Law and ethics in medicine. Il I SHINDELL
Schreiner's second category is:
2. An investigation related to the condition that patient is suspected of
having and that may result in direct good to patient at some future time.
The example he used is cardiac catheterization in early stages of rheumatic
fever in order to improve knowledge of hemodynamics at this stage of
disease.
Specific consent of patient with full knowledge of motives for study
would appear to be required in this situation, for otherwise such a pro-
cedure would clearly constitute an assault on the patient.
3. Investigations related to conditions that the patient may acquire with
a high degree of probability. Example: Base-line studies in young women
who are expected to become pregnant or nutrition studies on young men
expected to develop atherosclerosis or coronary disease. These certainly
require consent and procedures or techniques constituting any danger to
the experimental subject would not likely be condoned.
4. Investigations involving study of conditions that the subject is not
likely to acquire. Justification for this type of study rests not on personal
benefit but on some other principle, such as a contribution to the common
good. As an example, one might conceive of the studies on the transmission
of infectious hepatitis among prison volunteers. In this type of study we
begin to approximate the type of situation in which rules such as the Nurem-
berg code are appropriate.
Schreiner concludes with:
5. Studies which bear no relationship to disease processes or conditions
that could conceivably affect subject. These, I would suggest are the types
of studies that were condemned in the Nuremberg trials and for which the
rules were formulated.
It would appear reasonable to suggest that as one moves in the descending
order of categories of study-descending in terms of possible benefit to the
patient-the obligation to the patient to minimize risk and to preserve the
independence of his decision increases. Recognition of these precepts has
been embodied in the recent "Declaration of Helsinki" promulgated by the
World Medical Association.' In this code of ethics a distinction is made
between "clinical research combined with professional care" and "non-
therapeutic clinical research," with the principal provision of the Nurem-
berg code embodied in the latter.
I think we can agree that the position of a physician demands that,
at best, he can only offer the individual the opportunity to become an
experimental subject, and the obligation to inform a patient in obtaining
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consent must be at least as great as one applies in therapeutic situations
and becomes increasingly greater as one descends the Schreiner scale. To
do otherwise is not only to breach the position of trust imposed by the
profession, but also to breach the contractual relationship imposed by
society's norms.
The principal problem inherent in enlisting the cooperation of human
subjects in investigation is the temptation to exploit the position held
by the physician. I do not suggest this is done consciously. Often the line
between what is for the patient's direct therapeutic benefit and that which
is to satisfy the curiosity of the clinician or investigator may be quite hazy.
In the simplest example, drawing a few extra milliliters of blood for
an additional chemical determination progresses to become a matter of
doing a series of bone marrow examinations just to build up base-line
information. Seldom does a patient question what determinations are being
performed or what reason exists for doing them. If he does question, he
is usually given the most cursory answers or may be incapable of under-
standing the specific reason even if given. What I suggest is that the patient
may think that what is being done is for his direct therapeutic benefit when
in fact it might not be.
I think it is valid to suggest that patients think that everything done
to them is for their direct benefit, and for an investigator to exploit this
belief requires at least introspection on his part. It is not enough to suggest
that the patient should expect to become a participant in investigations
simply because he comes to a university hospital. Even if one might
expect an increased likelihood of research being conducted in the university
setting, at the very least the patient should be appraised of the possibility
(or probability) when entering a teaching service of research ward. We,
at the University of Pittsburgh have devised a special consent form which
does just this. We have included language such as the following: "I realize
that I may have special studies performed that are ordinarily not a part of
normal diagnosis, and may receive drugs or other treatments not yet in
widespread use, and I freely consent to the use of these tests and treat-
ments performed in the interest of medical science. However, I understand
that no test or treatment will be administered which may involve any
unusual risk unless the nature and probability of the risk and the reason
for the procedure are explained to me and my separate written consent
obtained."
We operate on the premise, and have no reason to believe otherwise, that
the norms which apply to the basic doctor-patient relationship will apply
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to the special experimenter-subject relationship should an issue ever arise.
Just as the only real defense to a claim of negligence in practice is to
demonstrate that careful, competent medicine has been applied in good
faith and in the patient's interest, we believe that ability to show con-
formance to a high standard of care and competence in investigative work
will be protection from any claim that may arise from an experimental
situation, provided we can show that we were cognizant of and exercised
concern for the rights of the patient as a human being.
I suggest that the appropriate standard for investigative work rests in
the nature of the relationship which exists between the parties. Since, in
the conduct of research, a benefit is to be derived above and beyond the
direct care for the patient, it would seem that the rights of the patient
should be greater than they would be under the normal relationship. It
would appear that the position of trust granted the physician clearly en-
larges, rather than abridges the basic rights the patient would normally
possess in the usual relationship.
THE CARE OF THE TERMINALLY ILL
When we come to consider the rights of patients when the physician is
placed in a position of trust, we come inevitably to what is probably the
most difficult problem facing the physician-the question of terminal ill-
ness and the artificial prolongation of life. That this should be a difficult
question is readily understandable, for the greater the trust afforded any
person, the greater the burden to be borne by him. When I suggested earlier
that the appropriate courses of action are largely unformulated, it is
probably because formulation is a difficult task, and difficult tasks are often
avoided if possible.
There is, of course, a single rule which presumably applies to all cir-
cumstances, and that is the physician is bound to prolong life in all in-
dividuals as long as he can by whatever means he has at hand. Recognizing
that at times, because of intractable pain, the end of life occasionally
becomes unbearable, the major religions in contemporary American society
suggest that a physician may not always be bound to employ any and all
means at his disposal. Rather he may restrict his ministrations to the em-
ployment of "ordinary" but not "extraordinary" means. As a practical
matter, however, this leaves the problem where it began, because it is now
necessary to define the term "extraordinary."
It also becomes necessary to define the circumstances under which the
withholding of extraordinary means may be "justified." And just as the
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rule of the Nuremberg trial is designed to apply to one portion of a
problem which exists in a spectrum, it is possible that the problems we
have in considering appropriate care for the terminally ill result from the
fact that here we are dealing with a spectrum also. In my view, we can
divide the spectrum somewhat arbitrarily into five parts, and approach
each in turn. Unlike the division we employed for experimentation, how-
ever, we are not really faced with a gradation of a single attribute, but
with somewhat dissimilar conditions containing common features.
For convenience then, rather than on any logical basis, let us arbitrarily
divide our problem into the following specific situations:
a) The maintenance of "normal" life by "unusual" means (e.g., use
of pacemaker, dialysis, respirator, etc.)
b) The maintenance of "abnormal" life-
1. by "usual" means: resuscitation of severely deformed infant at
birth, use of supportive measures in person with severe brain
damage, etc.
2. by "unusual" means: use of modalities as in group a) for persons
whose physical status is as in b) 1.
c) "Anti-dysthanasia" (failure to take positive action to prolong life
of incurable patient with intractable pain)
d) Euthanasia (taking positive action to end life of person described
in c)
Little is left to be said about these categories. The only apparent problem
in the first category is cost and availability. I can see no essential difference
between a tablet of digitalis and a peritoneal dialysis except in cost, in
difficulty, and in ready availability. Should more patients require the
procedure than could be provided for, some judgment must be exercised.
Normally either chance is permitted to operate (first come, first served
or random choice if several at the same time) or some assessment of
relative benefit is made. These latter decisions are difficult and no one
wishes to make them. Essentially one adopts the norm of society and
attempts to fit the decision into the code of generally acceptable behavior.
Hence, if the mode of choice is "fair" and "equitable," i.e., conforming
to the standard of equality among men or reasonably understandable bases
for classification, the decision is considered acceptable.
This is the type of decision made in military or disaster situations, and
in dealing with waiting lists for admission to oversubscribed facilities.
In making our selection, however, something other than the welfare of
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each individual patient comes into play, since it is apparent that one
cannot act to the benefit of all individuals involved. We attempt to act,
nonetheless, for the benefit of the greaetest number of patients, or for
society as a whole.
It seems somewhat paradoxical to note that when the position of trust
must be assumed by the physician he employs no independent standard.
The element of trust consists of the right and duty to apply a generally
accepted standard. This appears to be the essence of the physician's burden
in this circumstance. He is entrusted with the task of being unswayed by
any consideration other than what is most equitable. At times he is unwilling
to carry this burden alone and a committee, as in the Seattle dialysis
center, is created to make this weighty decision.
Once having made a selection, we return attention to the patient himself,
but during the process of selection our so-called medical ethics are set
aside in favor of the broader ethical norm of society. It should be stated
frankly that while we make attempts to be impartial, the complete elimi-
nation of bias is more strived for than achieved.
In the remainder of the categories, we frankly recognize that another
principle comes into play. Again we cannot suggest that the individual
patient is our sole obligation. I'd like to suggest that in effect we assume
responsibility for therapy for the family as either in conflict with or as
overriding our concern for the patient who presents himself in these other
categories.
Let us take them in order. There is a tendency to use only the most
cursory efforts at resuscitation (or none at all) at the birth of an anen-
cephalic infant. Whether we like it or not, we must admit that we may
baptize the infant and hope it does not survive. We tend to feel it is
kinder to the mother who may subsequently produce a healthy child to
have to tell her she had a still-birth than to have to burden her with a
malformed infant who can never realize the hopes and dreams parents have
for their children.
The picture changes, of course, if the child breathes spontaneously.
Our morality will not permit us (and should not permit us) to destroy the
child. This is violative of the expectation of the public of the function of
the physician, an image which we share. But a discussion of this issue
properly belongs later since the spontaneous life appearing in the malformed
child removes it from the category now being considered.
More important to consider in this category than the case of the mal-
formed infant, however, is the use of supportive measures in the individual
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with severe brain damnage arising from either trauma or resuscitative efforts
applied too late, or from sequellae of intoxicating substances. It is more im-
portant for two principal reasons: because of the growing frequency of
occurrence, and because of the status of the patient within the family. We
are no longer dealing with a person who is in contact with the world as
in the first category of cases or with a person never having been in
contact with the world as was the case with our last example. We now must
consider the person who has lost contact with the world and our query
revolves around our obligation to maintain vegetative function. It appears
that with our increased ability to maintain vital processes, we have come
to find it difficult to define life.
The problem faced by the physician is how vigorous he is to be in
the application of supportive therapy. In conflict is his obligation as a
physician to maintain life and his humanity as he sees the toll taken by
such a patient on the family.
The major religions in this country are in substantial agreement
that "extraordinary" measures need not be employed to maintain vitality
in this type of patient. The definition of "extraordinary," however, is left
again to the doctor. I would suggest, however, that it really is no longer
a medical decision in terms of patient need, but an assessment of how
much needs to be done to deal with the hope of recovery possessed by
the family, and their feelings of guilt over past relationships. Actual treat-
ment is terminated at that nebulous point where the family reinforces the
physician's feelings that "we have done all we can."
The point at which this decision is reached is often a function of the age
of the patient, for not too dissimilar from the case I presented is that
of the aged patient who has had a series of cerebral vascular accidents
or is in advanced renal failure and lapses in and out of coma. There is no
good standard on which a decision is made, except possibly to suggest
that the physician maintains therapy as long as he reasonably can. In
this category of patient, more so than in the previous, reliance on "pro-
fessional judgment" is required.
We cannot dispose of this type of patient, however, without adding
one additional component-self-doubt on the part of the physician. The
classification of the patient into this category is based on some estimate of
prognosis, i.e., the patient will not improve. Yet all of us have seen how
wrong we can be on occasion. All of us have seen comatose patients we
were certain were hopeless return to consciousness. The frequency is
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slight, but we do not normally practice medicine on the basis of probabilities.
Because of our lack of certainty we tend to maintain therapy because we
refuse to accept the onus of not doing so with the possibility of error. It is
because of the ambivalence involved in this problem that neither we as
a profession, nor our religious brethren, nor the public as a whole have
been able to arrive at any clearcut criteria for decision. It might be said
that it is in this type of situation that the physician carries his burden of
trust most heavily, for there is no way for him to avoid or to share it.
In view of what we have just said about the maintenance of "abnormal"
life by "usual" means, the next category, i.e., employment of "unusual"
means should require no discussion. But it does. The problem as I stated
it lies in the definition of what is "unusual" or "extraordinary." If we
look on this problem simply as a matter of cost and availability, as we
did when our patient was in contact with the world, we can postulate a
circumstance in which the modalities are available, albeit costly. Does
the fact that a person has lost contact with the world alter the circumstance?
When do we stop?
WHEN DOES DEATH OCCUR?
Two problems have recently arisen in this connection. The first is a
matter of professional liability. Could a patient's family maintain an
action for malpractice if a physician failed to use any means available
to maintain life? There is recent suggestion that the answer might be yes.
The real answer lies, however, in the fact that, as was mentioned, one
of the objectives in treating a patient in extremis is to treat the family.
I would suggest that if adequate rapport with the family had been main-
tained, an issue on the propriety of therapy should not have arisen, and
I would remind you that when such a question does arise, it is society's
norms which are applied.
The other problem is contained in a recent British case8 and also raised
a difficult legal question. The facts are relatively clearcut and may be briefly
stated. A young man received severe head injuries in a fight and was
brought to a hospital. Fourteen hours after admission spontaneous respira-
tions ceased and he was placed in a respirator, permission having
been obtained for removal of a kidney intended for transplant. Twenty-
four hours later, the transplantation operation was performed, and the
patient removed from the respirator at which time respiration and circula-
tion ceased. An inquest was held to determine when death had occurred
and whether the physicians were guilty of any offense in turning off
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the respirator. At the inquest it was said that the patient was medically
dead, i.e., incapable of independent life, as of the time his respirations
initially ceased and hence the kidney was removed from one who was
already dead. The medico-legal reporter of the British Medical Journal
expressed serious doubt about this case, as I think it is proper to do. If
vital processes (except for cerebration) could be maintained by respirator,
was not the physician bound to keep the respirator going once he had
applied it? Are we faced with the necessity of defining life, not in terms
of independent existence, since pace-makers and respirators have changed
this, but in some other terms? If we use the test of contact with the
world, are we forced to reevaluate our approach to the catatonic schizo-
phrenic?
Are we possibly to be faced with the same problem that was present on
the West Coast with dialysis already mentioned, in which a committee
was appointed to decide who should receive this mode of therapy? Will
we have to empanel committees to decide when to discontinue artificially
maintained respiration and circulation?
This brings us to the last two categories: the issue of euthanasia, and
the category designated by Fletcher9 as anti-dysthanasia. The distinc-
tion between the two is one of acts of omission versus acts of commission,
anti-dysthanasia being a matter of failing to take positive action to maintain
life, while euthanasia, as generally understood means the affirmative decision
and act to end a life which has "permanently ceased to be agreeable or
useful."8
Sperry, in reviewing the subject,'0 points out that in many primitive
societies and in pre-christian Greece various forms of infanticide were prac-
ticed as a kind of "social surgery." Orthodox Judaic teaching and classical
Christian thought have been consistent in their opposition to the taking of
human life under such circumstances. St. Thomas Aquinas condemned any
thought of euthanasia as
a) Unnatural, i.e., contrary to the charity man bears himself,
b) An offense against the community, and
c) A usurpation of God's power to kill or to make alive.
Leo Alexander' suggests that euthanasia can only exist when the society
that condones it has departed from the principle of equality among men.
For, in his view, euthanasia requires a value judgment concerning certain
individuals, and is based on the premise that there is a life not "worthy"
to be lived.
Hence, while general agreement can be found concerning "the legality of
expediting death of an incurable patient in acute agony by withholding
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from him such medicaments as sustain his continued life by unnatural
means," there is considerable disagreement on the issue of euthanasia.
There was once a bill actually introduced in the New York Legislature,
which would permit a patient to apply for the procedure, require a certifica-
tion by a physician, and empanel a committee to consider the petition of the
patient. There was considerable opposition to the bill on the basis that
such a procedure (like divorce or mental hospital commitment) might
become essentially routine. There was also fear that there might be ex-
pansion of criteria, and the Nazi experience in which 275,000 persons
were put to death with conditions such as mental deficiency, psychosis,
epilepsy, senility, post-polio, Parkinson's disease, multiple sclerosis, and
brain tumor, was cited.
Proposals periodically are made to reintroduce the topic. The medical
profession has in general been unwilling to assume the responsibility. Yet
whenever cases do occur in which without any authorization death has
been brought about, seldom is any action taken, and if taken, seldom is it
drastic. A New Hampshire physician injected air into one of his patients
in the early 1950's, and his only punishment was temporary suspension of
license. There was also a physician tried for murder in Liege in 1963
for complicity with the mother in destroying a Thalidomide baby, but was
acquitted.
These cases, I think, testify to the ambivalence we have over the severe
problem we face when we see extreme suffering and at the same time are
bound by our morality to preserve life. Here is the point when Holmes'
description to the doctor's task (to cure seldom, to relieve often, to comfort
always) becomes most apt. Here it would seem that it is our privilege, and
unquestionably our duty "to comfort always."
In the context with which I started, we as physicians are bound by our
societal norms to discharge the contract we enter into with our patient,
guided by the principle of the integrity of the individual human being
which pervades our religious and our legal system, and by the responsi-
bilities imposed upon us by the position of trust we derive from our own
ethical standards. The reason, it seems, that there is no satisfactory answer
to the dilemmas which occasionally face us is that there is no way to bear
a trust and not to keep it.
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